Political Blunders Behind The Falklands War

From 'Tempest in a Teapot' by Reginald & Elliot, 1983

The American academics Reginald & Elliot in their excellent 1983 study of the Falklands War entitled 'Tempest in a Teapot' pose the questions, "Why did two apparently civilised nations go to war over a group of 2,000 worthless islands in the South Atlantic? Could the fighting have been prevented?" They suggest, "The answers lie in the shortsightedness of the governments involved", the real causes of the war being more to do with "governmental blunders" than with historic claims.

"While Britain agreed to negotiate with the Argentines over the Falklands question in 1965, it did so halfheartedly, without any sense of urgency or purpose. Indeed, one is struck while studying the recent history of the Falklands by Britain's seeming inability to decide just what it wanted to do with the islands. At times the British government appeared ready to cede the Falklands to Argentina, in whole or in part, irrespective of the inhabitants' wishes; on other occasions, Britain said it would respect the desires of the natives without actually taking steps to defend them should the worst come to pass.

Of course, the Falkland Islands occupied only a small part of Britain's attention during a period filled with perilous crises. Still, the basic policy followed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office during the decades of negotiations seemed to be a fervent desire that the issue would just get up and walk away. The professionals of the British Foreign Service consistently underestimated the persistence of their Argentine counterparts, consistently misjudged the long-term effects of delay on the Argentine populace and government, and consistently downplayed threats of action by the Argentine military if negotiations remained stalemated.

From the Argentine point of view, seventeen years of negotiations, with little more to show than a minor trade and travel agreement, were more than sufficient to address the key issues, particularly the sovereignty question. There were signs from the very beginning of the negotiations that Argentina was willing to compromise on some middle ground, if the end results would allow them to at least show the Argentine flag in the islands. One cannot condone the Argentine military solution, but the invasion is at least understandable, given the fact that virtually nothing had been achieved for thousands of hours of work on both sides.

Whether from lack of attention, or more probably from lack of consideration, Britain never seemed to take Argentina seriously, or to understand its peculiar viewpoint on matters related to national honour. It is, of course, easy to make judgements retrospectively; yet one fact stands out quite clearly: Britain made a series of minor diplomatic oversights that blended together into one horrendous blunder, including: its inability to educate its public, either in the Falklands or in Britain itself, on the dangers and options involved; its lack of decision, either to stand by the Falklands and provide a sufficient military presence to defend them, or to abandon the islands, all at once or over a period of time, by forcing the issue and transplanting those islanders unwilling to live under an Argentine administration; its failure to predict the consequences of its actions, such as withdrawing the armed icebreaker Endurance during a period of mounting tensions; its faulty diplomatic and military intelligence, which provided the government with only two days' advance notice of the Argentine invasion; and, finally, a certain condescension in its dealings with the Argentine government, which contributed mightily to the failings mentioned above.

Alone, these might have been minor bumps on the road to good relations between two sovereign countries. Cumulatively, they helped bring on a war neither government really wanted. In the end, Britain had helped manoeuvre itself into a position in which Margaret Thatcher had no option, in her opinion, but to strike back.

….. Galtieri miscalculated at every turn, judging that the United States would remain neutral; that Britain would do nothing but protest to the United Nations; that in the unlikely event of military action, Britain would receive no help from other nations, and did not have in any case the military capability to retake the Falklands; that Argentina could defend its beachhead on the Falklands with ill-trained conscripts; that Brigadier General Menendez, having deployed his soldiers so poorly that even Galtieri noticed their misplacement on his visit to the Falklands, was still the man to lead the Argentines to victory; that after the Argentine surrender, Galtieri could still continue fighting a shooting war, while remaining leader of his country.

….. With both sides failing to take the other seriously, a confrontation was almost inevitable sooner or later. The crisis was precipitated by a conjunction of unfavourable events following the February 1982 negotiating session between Britain and Argentina. Although Britain somehow believed that relations were back to normal following these discussions, Argentina clearly came away from the talks with a feeling of déjà vu, and a sense that nothing would ever come from the negotiations. At that point Galtieri, undoubtedly pressured by Anaya and the General's own subordinates, decided to increase the stakes and put pressure on the British.

The first sign of this new policy was the release in Buenos Aires of the text of the proposed agreement. Simultaneously, Galtieri ordered preparation of a military option, in the event discussions reached an impasse within the next few months. Galtieri was not only impelled by his own sense of destiny and by the higher ranking officers in the Argentine military, but by a declining economy that threatened an end to the junta system itself. He gambled - and he lost.

As the month of March progressed, both sides began to lose control of the situation, essentially just reacting to events and to each other's responses to those events. The riots of March 30th and 31st forced Galtieri's hand. To save himself more than his country, he ordered the invasion to proceed, thereby raising the stakes one step higher.

Once the Argentine forces were committed, neither side could back down, since doing so would mean the end of whichever government broke ranks first. Furthermore, one of the two governments was almost certain to fall in any event, depending on the war's outcome. By this time, any real possibility of a negotiated settlement had long since passed. Barring the unlikely event of a battlefield stalemate, the war would continue until one or the other side emerged victorious, thereby vindicating the judgement of the political leader in question, and dooming the fate of the loser."

Source: R. Reginald & J.M. Elliot, 'Tempest in a Teapot : The Falkland Islands War', (1983), The Borgo Press, San Bernardino, California, USA

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