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UK Considered Handover to Argentina in 1968 By Peter J. Pepper The release of more files at the Public Records Office has shed new light on the critical 1967/68 period when discussions with Argentina nearly led to a 'Memorandum of Understanding' (MOU) that would have indicated a British willingness to cede Falklands sovereignty under certain conditions. The Falklands Emergency Committee was founded then, which later became the Falklands Islands Association - and the battle for Islander consent joined and finally won. Argentine success in the notoriously biased UN Decolonisation Committee in 1964 led to a resolution in the UN General Assembly in 1965 calling for a peaceful negotiated solution to the Falklands dispute. Britain entered into negotiations mainly to comply with this. new documents reveal this was done although the British Government had no doubts over its sovereignty, but wanted to satisfy the UN and Argentina. Negotiations were carried on in secret and Islanders kept in the dark. Communications a problem Argentina also wanted communications with the Falklands to get a foothold there, but would not make an agreement over this without the MOU first. It feared that otherwise Argentine ships and planes visiting the Falklands would imply recognition of British sovereignty. At the time, Argentine ships wouldn't enter the Falklands at all - to avoid flying courtesy flags. But Britain argued that communications at the same time as the MOU would be too big a shock for the Islanders and wanted these established first, so Islanders could get used to contact with Argentina. Sadly, one FO idea - that illustrates the depths it was prepared to stoop - was to sign the MOU secretly and then only publish it dated to coincide with a later communications agreement! Yet another Argentine objective was to get 'Freedom of Settlement' incorporated into the MOU - to allow Argentines to flood into the Islands. Britain rejected this completely. Islander Consent - and the 'Unilateral Statement' The biggest stumbling block was Britain's wish that any MOU should say that Islanders must consent to any transfer of sovereignty. Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart, was adamant about this, and Parliament was told several times. This was bitterly opposed by Argentina. Their insistence and British weakness got it removed from the draft memorandum - but not from British policy. So the MOU itself just said that Britain had to be satisfied with the Argentine 'safeguards and guarantees' to secure the Islanders' interests. But to put Islander approval back Britain planned to publish a 'Unilateral Statement' at the same time as the MOU stating it would not cede sovereignty without Islander consent. Governor Sir Cosmo Haskard was deeply troubled by what he knew to be going on - but was not allowed to reveal to the Islanders. He warned of the disgust locally that HMS sho8uld think of cession of sovereignty under any circumstances, and that no change was acceptable. He was right too. When authorised to tell just the Councillors, in July 1967, the reaction was absolute horror. Sir Cosmo became so concerned about what was going on that he went to London in February 1968 to speak to everyone he could to put the Islanders' point of view - to no avail. When he got back and revealed what he was allowed to, there was more horror. Councillors broke their oaths of secrecy and went public with a broadsheet (see below) to every MP. Sadly, the FO had only skullduggery to offer. A suggestion to Sir Cosmo was: "You might well suggest indirectly that the broadsheet by making difficulties for Government in Parliament may not contribute to a solution to the problem or be in their best interests." Sir Cosmo did nothing of the kind. Instead he asked for a Minister to visit - to see local reaction for himself. But the FO didn't want this until the MOU was agreed. Islanders wanted the Queen to come on her planned Latin American tour - but both Argentina and the Falklands were deliberately left out. Chalfont Visit In the end, Lord Chalfont came, in late November 1968. His visit had been intended to coincide with publication of the MOU. But Cabinet concerns to raise the status of the Unilateral Statement by linking it to the MOU had delayed this (and had not in the end been accepted by the Argentines). So Chalfont came to explain the MOU to the Council - but not to be persuaded against it. The Council objected in the strongest terms, but its ominous clauses were basically a fait accompli. In fact, a final decision on the MOU had not been taken - as the Foreign Secretary was on his way to India. But Lord Chalfont, although anticipating problems in Parliament and the Cabinet, thought it should be signed. Ordinary Islanders were still kept completely in the dark, but learned about it from the journalists who accompanied Lord Chalfont. No Transfer Without Consent Lord Chalfont assured the Council that sovereignty would not be ceded without their consent. He stressed that the MOU would be published together with the Unilateral Statement which would say this. He assured a disbelieving Council that this Unilateral Statement had equal weight to the MOU itself. He carefully explained that safeguards would guarantee the use of English, property and religious rights, etc. Chalfont says in his report that the Islanders "may one day be prepared to choose Argentine sovereignty". He goes on to say "We must at all costs avoid giving the Islanders the impression that we want to get rid of them, since that would set up the reaction we want to avoid." Chalfont wanted to break down what he called "fossilised attitudes". He singled out A.G. Barton for criticism as "all but irredeemably reactionary" in his attitude towards Argentina. Chalfont thought this was due to lack of contact with Argentina among the Islanders. As retired manager of the FIC, Barton had deployed his skills well. Chalfont complained that Barton and Sid Miller communicated with the Falklands Emergency Committee nearly every day. But history has proved the Islanders right. Argentina was again a military dictatorship in 1968, under the murderous General Ongania. It was in chaos then, as it is now. Lord Chalfont saw evidence of this himself. During his visit, Argentine newspaper Cronica landed a light plane illegally on a Falklands road, demanded an interview with him, and published hysterical stories for a week about British 'Pirates'. Misgivings and Opposition But Sir Michael Creswell, British Ambassador in Buenos Aires, could see the risks. He had warned earlier that there might be friction with Argentina if Islanders simply refused to contemplate any change of status, or cooperate in any process leading to integration with Argentina and that Argentina might be unable to accept that the process of change would, in any case, be a slow one - the Argentine military junta wanted progress fast. He believed too that there was a basic inconsistency between the MOU and the Unilateral Statement. Opposition came from the Falklands Emergency Committee that lobbied so successfully. The All Party Parliamentary Group, which included a number of Labour MPs, was even more important - as was the Conservative Opposition. Last, but not least, the Falklands were lucky to have Sir Cosmo Haskard from the Colonial Service - not the FO. He had grown up with traditions of service to colonial subjects. FO influence became more common in subsequent governors. Some might not have represented the Islanders so well. How it Failed - Consent Paramount On his way back from the Falklands Lord Chalfont met Argentine Foreign Minister Costa Mendez in Buenos Aires. Costa Mendez told him that although he liked the MOU, Argentina would not sign it, if Britain were to promptly 'cancel it out' by the planned Unilateral Statement to Parliament promising not to transfer sovereignty without Islander consent. Lord Chalfont replied that the MOU would be unacceptable to Parliament without this. Two days later, Costa Mendez said publicly: "An agreement with Britain would only be signed if.....it included recognition of Argentine sovereignty. It could not provide for recognition of sovereignty being made subject to an expression of will of the inhabitants." A message followed that Argentina would not sign unless Britain agreed with Argentina on what its Unilateral Statement to Parliament might say! Finally, Sir Michael Creswell reported that Argentina would not sign unless its sovereignty were recognised 'virtually unconditionally'. This was not just a last minute Argentine challenge to the promise made to the Islanders. The Government was also using this promise to rebus very serious Parliamentary and press criticism of the negotiations as a whole. The end came on December 11th. Harold Wilson's Cabinet rejected the MOU unless the Islander consent in the Unilateral Statement were explicitly incorporated in the MOU itself - or were explicitly linked to it. The MOU was over. But Argentina came back with a proposal for links with the Falklands in April 1969 - without any preconditions over sovereignty. This led to the 1971 Communications Agreement. In hindsight, we can all see it for the disaster it was. Lord Chalfont had assured the Council that the MOU was not a binding agreement to cede sovereignty - but just to consider this, if the safeguards were considered satisfactory, and the Islanders consented. This was the opinion of Government legal advisers too. This was politically naive, especially with such an unstable and aggressive country as Argentina. By contrast, Sir Cosmo could see it as the irrevocable step it would have been - and that there was no chance of getting genuine consent from the Islanders. The two concepts were irreconcilable. Worst of all, it had all been done in near total secrecy. The Daily Express, which had exposed much
of the process, called it "one of the most squalid and discreditable
chapters in British history". The Sunday Times called the
Argentine claim ludicrous. But the Argentines had been led to
believe that they could get what they wanted. We all know the
result. Stanley, Falkland Islands To Members of Parliament From Unofficial Members of Falkland Islands Executive
Council ARE YOU AWARE THAT - TAKE NOTE THAT - ARE YOU AWARE THAT - Lord Caradon said to the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1965: "The people of this territory are not to be betrayed or bartered. Their wishes and their interests are paramount and we shall do our duty in protecting them." British Ministers have said the same until 1967 since when there has been silence. QUESTIONS - WE NEED YOUR HELP! PROFILE A key figure in frustrating a possible Falklands handover to Argentina in 1968 was Sir Cosmo Haskard, KCMG, whom the Islanders were fortunate to have as Governor. As well as representing the Sovereign, which was easy as he found the Falklands extremely loyal, he considered it his duty to pass Islanders' views to London as well as explaining UK policy to them. His wise handling of the explosive circumstances won him the respect and friendship of many Islanders. He regarded the MOU as ludicrous because of its incompatible aims of considering ceding sovereignty while trying to meet Islanders' wishes. While Islanders maintain a healthy suspicion of the Foreign Office, Cosmo Haskard was from the old school of experienced colonial administrators, as was a later governor and champion of the Falklands, Sir Rex Hunt. Both began their careers in Africa, where Sir Cosmo spent many years. The Falklands were therefore a surprising switch of scene. Even as the Haskards were on their way to their new outpost, an Argentine nationalist landed his aircraft illegally, and planted an Argentine flag. It was 1964, and a shock start to Sir Cosmo's six year stint, which exactly paralleled Lord Chalfont's time as Foreign Office Minister. The two men had much in common. Of the same generation, both served as officers in East Africa and Burma in the 1939-45 war. Sir Cosmo was a major and got a military MBE before taking up his colonial career in 1946. Chalfont continued in the army becoming a colonel with a military OBE until appointed Times Military Correspondent, then a Foreign Office Minister. On sovereignty, the two men had marked differences. Sir Cosmo, now 85, fit and happily retired in Ireland with his wife, continues to support the Islanders as a distinguished Vice-President of the Falkland Islands Association. He and his wife still keep in touch with their Falklands friends.
This article first
appeared in the Falkland Islands Newsletter, Edition 80, January 2002.
The Falkland Islands Association is an independent organisation which
brings together those who support the continuing freedom of the people of
the Falkland Islands. Its Constitution states that its objectives
are to assist the people of the Falkland Islands to decide their own
future for themselves without being subjected to pressure direct or
indirect from any quarter.
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Introduction, Brief
History, Timeline, 1982
Articles, 1982
Timeline, 1982 Documents, Articles,
Agreements, UN
Resolutions
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