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Falklands War official history verdict: 'result could have been different'Harold Briley New revelations in the soon to be published British official History of the Falklands Campaign indicate that a few key acts by Argentine commanders could have produced a different outcome, possibly avoiding defeat. And, if General Galtieri's military junta instead of launching an impetuous invasion, Argentina may peacefully have attained its long-term ambition of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands because economic and social stagnation and population decline before 1982 could eventually have made the situation 'untenable'. These are two of the many controversial arguments examined in this official history, written by one of Britain's foremost military academics, Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman, who is Professor of War Studies at King's College, London, invited by the Government to carry out the task. He has taken eight years to collate and assess masses of information, much of it hitherto secret intelligence. The issue is comprehensively covered in two volumes. The first deals with the origins of the Anglo-Argentine dispute going back centuries and with the run-up to invasion. The second volume covers the conduct of the war and its aftermath until diplomatic relations were restored in 1990. The two volumes run to more than 130,000 words and cost £90, published by Frank Cass Limited. In advance of publication, Professor Freedman has given extensive clues to his conclusions in an article in the magazine History Today. Professor Freedman had access to secret official files which focus fresh light on the help given to the United Kingdom by Chile and the United States and also on the tensions that developed in American-British relations in the immediate aftermath of the invasion as President Ronald Reagan and his Secretary of State, General Alexander Haig, acted at first as even-handed intermediaries in an attempt to achieve a diplomatic settlement. At the same time the Pentagon and the United States military were making "extraordinary efforts" to supply equipment and materials, for example updated side-winder missiles which proved so effective on Harrier jump-jet aircraft. The history may also explain the mystery of why a helicopter carrying elite SAS troops made an emergency landing on Chilean territory. Professor Freedman emphasises that "success could by no means be taken for granted" as the military commanders knew at the time. In this, he echoes the assessment of the task force commander, Admiral Sir Sandy Woodward, that it was a close-run outcome as ammunition was expended and his ships were mercilessly battered by Argentine air attack and severe Atlantic weather. The professor points out that it was a war fought with a "small margin for error". The campaign and individual military engagements "could be turned by a moment of heroism or a loss of nerve, by an act of will or a critical error". He suggests that the outcome could have been different if the Argentines had not made a series of military errors such as not keeping their navy at sea after the sinking of the Belgrano, or by attacking warships instead of the ships carrying troops and equipment, and by not patrolling "more aggressively" as the British advanced towards the capital. If they had acted differently, he says, "the result could have been different. And the loss of one of the two British aircraft carriers would have forced the British Government to reconsider." With so many previous accounts of the war written by the Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, other Ministers, military commanders, diplomats and journalists, and with so many contradictions, he says an official history, given access to the best possible official documentary information, can explore the "lingering controversies" and also examine how Britain arrived at some decisions and not at others. Professor Freedman recognises that access to so much official material might have resulted in a "sanitised account" confirming the "official line" and expressing only "safe and agreed opinions". He insists that the credibility of his history depends on its being his "own independent review". While accounts of the military campaign remain confused, Professor Freedman has benefited from full diplomatic information available from two key ambassadors, Sir Nicholas Henderson in Washington, and Sir Anthony Parsons at the United Nations. First published in the Penguin News on 17 June 2005, and reproduced with the kind permission of the Editor
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Introduction, Brief
History, Timeline, 1982
Articles, 1982
Timeline, 1982 Documents, Articles,
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